Unclarified questions
after two inspections performed in follow-up of an alert about risk of infection with hepatitis for foreign citizens in the St. Marina Hospital HD Unit, Varna City, Bulgaria

Translation from Bulgarian:
Original in Bulgarian Back to chronology

From: Reneta Stoyanova
[address]

9-Jul-2003
To: Mr Chairman of Parliament Commission of Health
Cc: Mr Minister of Health
Cc: Mr President of R. of Bulgaria
Cc: Mr Premier of R. of Bulgaria


Re: Unclarified questions after two inspections performed in follow-up of an alert about risk of infection with hepatitis for foreign citizens in the St. Marina Hospital HD Unit, Varna City, Bulgaria

Dear Mr Chairman, Mr Minister, Mr President, Mr Premier,

I am addressing you not because I have not addressed the competent bodies in the relevant way but because I have not been satisfied by the measures taken by these bodies. When it concerns human life and health, even the slightest flaw could be fatal, and the bodies who took up the inspections in follow-up of my alert seem to have allowed certain negligence in their work which I shall try to prove herewith.

By the end of May, two inspections were made in the abovementioned HD unit in follow-up of my alert (see Supplement 1. Risk of infection with hepatitis for foreign citizens) whose results were submitted to me (see Supplement 2. Inspections performed: 1st Inspection Report and 2nd Inspection Report) by the Minister of Health through a copy of his letter to the Chairman of Parliament Commission of Health (see Supplement 3) with enclosed results from the inspections and a contract concluded for dialyzing of 16 Belgian citizens in the unit in question (see Supplement 4). Minister B. Finkov writes in his letter that "the results from the two inspections unequivocally show that there are no cases of medical malpractice in the treatment and epidemiologic regimes in the clinic of hemodialysis in St. Marina Hospital – Varna and, moreover, that it is one of the leading medical establishments within the network of hemodialysis units in Bulgaria and can successfully participate in the international exchange of patients in the field of dialysis treatment."

Regretfully, I could not share Minister Finkov’s optimism before I have had the answers of the following questions:

1. Is it true that HCV-negative patients are dialyzed on machines supposedly devoted only for HCV-positive patients? (see Supplement 5.)

2. What is the exact number of the machines devoted to HCV-positive patients at the time of the inspections – seven or eight? (see Supplement 2, 1st Inspection and 2nd Inspection) 3. What is the percentage of hepatitis virus carriers in the inspected unit (see Supplement 2, 1st Inspection and 2nd Inspection)? 4. How is the percentage of a nosocomial infection in an HD unit calculated? 5. Where and how is peritoneal dialysis performed? 6. The serological tests on the basis of which is calculated the percentage: 7. Is it true that the patients are not tested regularly? The inspections: "The testing of the patients and the staff for the viruses of hepatitis B and C was performed systematically and along all indicators until the end of the first quarter of 2002. After the publication of Regulation # 2 for organization and conduct of preventive examinations of persons from 0 to 18 years and observation of chronically diseased obligatory health insured persons, publ. State Gazette, issue 16/18-Feb-2003, the time periods of testing follow the instructions."

8. How were tested the patients and the staff during almost a year– from the end of the first quarter of 2002 until publishing of Regulation # 2 in SG, issue 16/18-Feb-2003 – did they have regular tests? 9. How were they tested after publishing of Regulation # 2 – did they have regular tests? 10. Does Regulation # 2, in SG, issue 16/18-Feb-2003 regulate the regular serologic testing of patients and staff in the HD unit? The inspections: "In view of the high risk of the medical staff’s activities it is necessary that specification and optimization be made of the periodic serologic tests for viruses"

11. What specification and optimization are necessary – specifically? 12. The alert about risk of infection with hepatitis for foreign citizens (Supplement 1) reports of the lost results from tests for hepatitis and AIDS of several nurses, incl. of nurse Reneta Stoyanova. Is that true? 13. Information from me: The blood was sent somewhere in February or the beginning of March with referrals from our GPs, and the results had not been found by the end of May. Is that true? 14. Information from me: On 28 and 29-May-2003 from all the patients and the whole staff blood was taken without any formalities for serologic tests for hepatitis B and C and HIV– along a common list as it was done before the Health Insurance Fund had been intiated. Is that true? 15. Has the laboratory ever had difficulties in supply with reagent and devices? 16. What are the guarantees that in the future patients and staff will be tested regularly in view of their highly risky epidemiologic settings? 17. Both inspections assert unanimously that "dialyzing of […] HBV carriers […] is done in a separate, isolated from the common corridor, room with two stations." (see Supplement 2, 1st Inspection and 2nd Inspection.) 18. The inspections claim: "The epidemiologic standards are observed". What are these epidemiologic standards that are observed in the HD unit on inspection? 19. How had it been explained to the Bulgarian patients why changes in their usual schedule had to be done? 20. Information from me: on 27-May-2003, Tuesday, the HD unit was closed for Bulgarians in order to dialyze only foreign citizens. Is that true? 21. Information from me: On Tuesday, 27-May-2003, apart from the two 8-person groups of Belgian patients, another group, of 13 Israeli patients was expected to arrive. Is that true? 22. Information, given to me by a colleague: The Israeli group was dialyzed until 04:00 h on 28-May-2003. Is that true? 23. Not a single Israeli patient was dialyzed on 27th to 28-May-2003 in the St. Marina Hospital HD unit. 24. What documents are available in the HD unit after the foreigners have left? 25. Were the foreign patients registered in the medical registers available in the HD unit? 26. Is the auxiliary room at 436 suitable for washing and soaking into disinfectant of supplies for multiple usage? Such as the 19 5-liter buckets and about ten 20-liter buckets all of which daily stained with blood which exposes to risk not only the Bulgarian but also any foreign guest-patients because these buckets are routinely used and were used for the foreign patients at the end of May: in initiating and termination their HD sessions. 27. Are there auxiliary rooms devoted to HCV-positive patients? 28. Is there an auxiliary room at the changing room for the patients? 29. Which are the auxiliary rooms for the patients on dialysis? 30. Which auxiliary rooms did the foreign patients on dialysis use? 31. In what condition are the auxiliary rooms which use our patients and which the foreign patients had to use as well: is there hot water, toilet paper, soap, and are they disinfected after each usage, especially after usage by a virus carrier? 32. Is it possible in practice to devote mops to wash the floor only around the machines devoted to HCV-positives in the big common room? 33. Is it impossible in practice for an HCV-positive patient to suddenly bleed on getting out of his bed and to stain with blood the common room or another bed or the corridor or an auxiliary room in the HD unit? 34. Was the hospital epidemiologist asked for opinion before or during the conclusion of the contract to dialyze the foreign patient in this HD unit? 35. Has the epidemiologist, since she has occupied this position, ever noticed anything wrong in the epidemiologic settings of this HD unit? 36. How did the epidemiologist who occupied the position before the present epidemiologist deliver this responsible position: was everything in order in the hospital, and in this HD unit in particular? 37. Does the hospital epidemiologist have at her disposal any data about the percentage of hepatitis infected patients in this HD unit, and about the number of the machine devoted to hepatitis C infected patients in the common room? 38. Does the hospital epidemiologist have at her disposal any data about the percentage of hepatitis infected patients in other HD units in this country? 39. Does the hospital epidemiologist have at her disposal any data about the percentage of hepatitis infected patients in other HD units around the world, for instance in Belgium or Israel? 40. Has the epidemiologist kept a statistic data of virus carriers in this HD unit? 41. Can the epidemiologist (or someone else) present data in dynamics about a period of up to five years backwards: number of patients and staff in each testing, year, how many times were they tested during a year, results, percentage of virus carriers? 42. If the epidemiologist (or someone else) has kept statistics, for how long and who has access to it? 43. What sources does the one who keeps the statistic data draw upon; is her/her access to initial source direct or is there a mediator between the source of data and the person keeping the statistics? 44. Is it easy to make inspection on the epidemiologic data in this HD unit in dynamics? 45. Is it true that there were about 80% hepatitis C infected in this HD unit, as the alert claims? 46. Was a consultant infectionist called to examine the HCV and HBV-positive patients? 47. Was the archive inspected during the inspections? There must be kept the history of disease cases with a recorded consult with infectionist for our infected patients from the time when the percentage had reached about 80%. 48. One of the commissions ascertained that “during the period 22-26 May, 2003, there was no case of dialyzing any Belgian citizen on a machine which had been used by an HBV carrier before”, and the other inspection did not mention anything on this issue (see Supplement 2. Inspections Performed, 1st Inspection and 2nd Inspection), and Minister Finkov, in his letter to Dr. A. Shterev, first economizes the phrase “during the period 22-26 May, 2003” from the report of the one commission, then does not mention the fact that the other refrained from commenting. The result is the semi-truth: “The report prepared by the commission points that there has not been a case of dialyzing a Belgian patient upon a machine used by a virus carrier of HBV before.” (see Supplement 3) 49. Where have our six HBV-positive patients come from? 50. Where had our patient G[…] been dialyzed before he was isolated in the “yellow room” as HBV-positive? 51. Were G.’s test results inspected: first test (date, result), second test (date, result) and so on until his identification as a hepatitis B virus carrier? 52. Are there any machine devoted to new patients who were admitted urgently and because of that had not been tested in advance for hepatitis and AIDS viruses? 53. Are all patients who start dialysis in this HD unit serologically tested in advance? 54. Is there a case of a patient not having been tested more than a month since s/he has started dialysis in this HD unit? 55. Is there a case of a patient not having been tested more than three months since s/he has started dialysis in this HD unit? 56. Is it considered that a machine used by not tested patient is clean? 57. Is it considered that a machine on which a HBV virus carrier was dialyzed for months? 58. On which machine had been patient G. dialyzed before he was moved to the yellow room? G. was identified as hepatitis B virus carrier, and this virus is recognized as much more infectious than that of hepatitis C. 59. The numbers of the machines on which the patients are dialyzed are recorded in which documents? When a patient is identified as virus carriers, is it easy to identify other patients who have shared the same machine with the newly identified virus carrier? 60. Can the numbers stuck on the machines (1, 2, 3 etc.) be unstuck? 61. Can the machines be moved from a place to another or from a room to another? 62. Does anyone watch and record the machine fluctuation: how many new items, what make, used for how many years, bought new from where, documents on the deal? 63. Are there second-hand machines in this HD unit? 64. If yes, were these second-hand machines accompanied with documented warranty that they had not been used by infected patients before? 65. In practice, how can be prevented the mistaken usage of devoted to HCV-positive patients machines by HCV-negative patients in a common room? 66. How are signaled the devoted to HCV-positive patients machines in the common room? 67. What can be done so as a devoted to HCV-positive machine should not be mistakenly used by a HCV-negative patient? (there was a case of such mistaken usage, recorded on 25-Mar-2003 in the physicians’ report available in this HD unit. The head of unit left the reported case unnoticed) 68. Had there never been any problems in this HD unit, problems of whatever character, before the alerting letter of 22-May-2003 was submitted to the highest health authorities? 69. Are there any reports of meetings in this HD unit? 70. What problems agitated the patients in this HD unit? 71. What problems agitated the staff in this HD unit? 72. How was it explained to the nurses in this HD unit that they had to do routine shifts from 18:00 to 24:00 h. (not because of the visiting foreigners but for many months before)? 73. Why were these shifts recorded on the nurses’ schedule not as 18:00 to 24:00 but as 13:00 to 19:00 h? 74. Had nurses ever received any overtime payment before the foreigners arrived? 75. Has it happened that a nurse suddenly got sick and the other nurses had to work her shifts too? 76. What problems has the leadership faced? 77. Was there a case when a patient could have been killed through a member of the staff's negligence? 78. What measure were taken after the accident of 24-Jan-2003 a patient nearly died through a member of the staff’s negligence? 79. How many witnesses were there of this accident? 80. According to the job profile of the HD nurse in this HD unit, is it the nurse alone authorized to connect a patient to his/her HD machine? (see Supplement 8. Job profile of an HD nurse in St. Marina Hospital) 81. Besides a nurse, is there, in practice, a doctor and a technician in the room when dialysis sessions are initiated? 82. Are there written explanations on the accident of 24-Jan-2003? (see Supplement 6. Written explanations on the accident of 24-Jan-2003) 83. Was there a meeting of the staff after that accident? 84. Was there a report on that accident to a higher instance? 85. The inspections have ascertained that the technical staff’s qualification is high. Was the high technical qualification of the staff ever questioned in the alerting letter of 22-May-2003? 86. The technical staff, besides their high technical qualification, do they have high medical qualification as well? 87. Is it true that the technical staff is responsible not only for the disinfection of the machines but also for the distribution of the patients upon the machines? 88. Who controls the disinfection of the machines and the distribution of the patients in practice? 89. Is there an alerting letter to the head of this HD unit about negligent attitude to the disinfection of the machines on the part of a technician? And this done before three witnesses? Is it true that the exposed before witnesses as negligent of his duties was Hikolay Nenov, Eng. (See Supplement 7. Alert to the head of HD unit of 24-Mar-2003) 90. Did the head of HD unit take any measures in follow-up of this alert? 91. Information from me: The alerting letter of 24-Mar-2003 was submitted by me to the executive director, Dr Kr. Ivanov, two months after I had submitted it to the head of HD unit. It was registered by the executive director’s secretary under the number 777/26-May-2003. Did Dr Kr. Ivanov take any measures? 92. Was the head of HD unit alerted about a case of mistakenly connecting an HCV-negative patient to a machine devoted to HCV-positives, the member of staff exposed as guilty being the same Nikolay Nenov, Eng? (see Physician's report of 25-Mar-2003 in the Register of physicians' reports available in the HD unit) 93. Has the head of HD unit taken any measures after he was notified in writing through the physician's report of 25-Mar-2003 about the case? 94. Would the head of HD unit, Dr Kiril Nenov, deny that he knew that not only Nikolay Nenov but all members of the technical staff have systematically violated the requirements of the medical standards that machines devoted to HCV-positive patients should be used by HCV-positive patients only? 95. Are the technicians aware of that they systematically violated the requirements of the medical standards that machines devoted to HCV-positive patients should be used by HCV-positive patients only? 96. Do the HCV-negative (or long time not tested) patients that they have used machines dedicated to HCV-positives? 97. Is it possible to observe the requirements of the medical standards that machines devoted to HCV-positive patients should be used by HCV-positive patients only with the present ration patients: machines and the present distribution of HCV-positives in the shifts? (see Supplement 5.) 98. The commission from the Regional Center of Health ascertained that "the sterilization mode of the machines is automated and does not permit any intervention until the end of the process. A machine cannot be started if the mandatory 45-minute thermochemical disinfection." 99. The other inspecting body, among whom there is a technically qualified person – P. Shterev, Eng., assert that “the dosage and time of exposition are programmed automatically”. Can Mr Shterev readily confirm that the time of exposition cannot be changed by a technically qualified person? 100. The commission from the Regional Center of Health ascertained that “a machine cannot be started if the mandatory 45-minute thermochemical disinfection has not been performed”? 101. Neither one nor the other commission has commented on how new are the newest machines in the HD unit? 102. Has Mr P. Shterev information on how many hours should a dialysis machine be used according to its manual? 103. Is the requirement of the company manufacturer on the number of the hours of exploitation observed in the HD unit? 104. Is the supply with spare parts regular? 105. Has the HD unit (the hospital) any debts to the service of the company manufacturer of the dialysis machines? 106. Does Mr Shterev know which models of Fresenius are the newest on the world market by the time of the inspection – what numbers and letters they bear? 107. Both commissions emphasize on that in the HD unit on inspection the disinfection of the machines between the shifts has always been performed in compliance with all requirements. Was the routine disinfection questioned in the alerting letter? 108. In the alerting letter about risk of infection with hepatitis for foreign patients, it was mentioned that there had been attempts at silencing the voices of subordinates who told unpleasant truths. Did any one ask the staff who were those subordinates and what were those unpleasant truths? 109. Is it possible that the staff has lost memory of what there have been noisy meetings? 110. A question from me: The staff might have lost memory, and no reports from any meetings might not be available. Why, however, no measures were taken neither after the accident of 24-Jan-2003 when a patient’s life was endangered nor after the report of 25-Mar-2003; why even Dr Kr. Ivanov did not reply this alerting letter of mine although it had been registered by his secretary under incoming # 777/26-May-2003. And why, ultimately, on receiving my alerting letter about risk of hepatitis infection fro foreign citizen, Dr. Kr. Ivanov called me to a conversation with threats of dismissal under the pretext that I lower the prestige of my direct boss? 111. A question from me: I cannot prove that Dr. Kr. Ivanov threatened me in advance, therefore I should admit that he did not threaten me but just called me to a conversation in his office. I cannot claim that he threatened me during our conversation, either, because there was not a witness. Therefore, I should admit that the conversation went in a calm atmosphere. I managed as well to tell Dr. Kr. Ivanov that the foreign patients were treated not registered in the two register books of the HD and asked him whether that was alright but, instead of an answer, Dr. Kr. Ivanov handed me my job profile and asked me to submit written explanations on the grounds of art. 193, para. 1, (Art 193. (1) (Alt. - SG, issue 21 of 1990, issue 100 of 1992) The employer is obliged, before imposing any disciplinary punishment, to listen to the worker and to accept his/her written explanations as well as to collect and evaluate the evidence presented), without explaining me in writing what my fault was. 112. On 29-May-2003, I was orally informed by my direct boss that I had been dismissed (this accompanied by shouts but since there is no way for me to prove that too, I should admit that it happened in a calm atmosphere). Immediately I submitted a request on that case to the head of HD unit and to the executive director of the hospital (see Supplement 9. Request to head of HD unit with copy to the executive director) registered under the incoming # 815/29-May-2003. Why have I not had a reply to this request? 113. On 30-May-2003 I submitted a well-grounded request for going on a paid (Supplement 10. A well-grounded request for a paid leave). Immediately, I was allowed one-month-long paid leave until 1-Jul-2003. But why did Dr Kr. Ivanov never pay attention to my arguments? 114. Why the controlling commissions did not seek my assistance during their inspections? If they had asked me to assist, this letter might have not been written. 115. In the report (see Supplement 2. Inspections performed, 1st Inspection and 2nd Inspection) made by one of the commissions, it can be read:
116. The contract concluded for dialyzing of the foreign patients (see Supplement 4), poses another round of questions, such as: I am addressing you with the request to order another, serious inspection, which should answer the questions left unanswered during the two previous inspections, as well as take measures to improve the epidemiologic conditions in the HD unit. I rely on your authority and competence for taking all the necessary measures on reinforcing the prestige of St. Marina Hospital and turning its HD unit into "one of the leading medical establishments within the network of hemodialysis units in Bulgaria and can successfully participate in the international exchange of patients in the field of dialysis treatment", indeed.

I do not seek punishment for the guilty persons but will feel moral satisfaction to learn that the problems having caused me to send my alerting letter will be resolved and will never happen again. The only reason to ask you is the well-being of the patients – regardless ours or foreign. I left my job with a 30-day notification to my employer (see Supplement 11.) and have no intention to return after all humiliation to which I was exposed but there remained diseased people who I ask you on behalf of the diseased people to whom I did not even manage to say good-bye, as it behoves after so many years together, and the hemodialysis patients become close friends to us because of the very specificity of the dialysis treatment: three times a week we meet for their procedures for long years on end. I did not manage to say good-bye to my former colleagues, and we spend nearly 16 years in harmonious team-work together. They are a wonderful team of highly qualified cadres who really do their best in serving the patients despite the shortage of information about their working conditions and epidemiologic requirements. I do believe that there will come a day when our HD unit will develop medical tourism on European level.

Perhaps you are this one who will accelerate the advent of this day.


Reneta T. Stoyanova, Personal ID # […], ex nurse with over 25 years of work experience , having worked almost 16 years in the St. Marina Hospital HD unit in Varna: from 1-Oct-1987 to 1-Jul-2003.

Date: 9-Jul-2003          Signature: